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Migrant remittances are very big business indeed. In addition to the $72.3 billion worth of 
remittances which Rathore (2003) estimates were transferred to the developing countries 
through formal banking channels in 2001, there are good reasons to suppose that funds worth 
at least as much again are transmitted in parallel to this asset flow through more informal 
channels such as IVTS and hawala. Not only are these transfers substantially higher than the 
total flow of official assistance to the developing world, but they are particularly beneficial in 
terms of economic development. Besides incurring no debt, their recipients are not only 
particularly heavily concentrated in some of the least developed regions in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, but are for the most part resident in rural areas, and more often than not in 
those where development has hitherto been particularly sluggish.  
 
Moreover migrant remittances and economic development are – or at least should be – two 
sides of the same coin. As far as migrant workers themselves are concerned, the central 
purpose of remitting a substantial part of their hard-won earnings back home is to invest in a 
better future, both for themselves and their families. Whilst remittances may indeed serve to 
meet their subsistence needs, that is very rarely the central goal of the whole operation, 
especially when migrants manage to penetrate metropolitan labour markets, where wages are 
dramatically higher than they are at home. Hence the vast bulk of transnational remittance 
flows are investment oriented, and destined to be put to use to construct a fine new house to 
house the entire extended family, to purchase additional more land and agricultural 
machinery, to dig new wells, to finance a local business enterprise, and if immediately 
profitable investment opportunities are not available in the immediate vicinity of the 
remitter’s home base, to be placed on deposit at the highest available rate of interest. To be 
sure the development potential of these capital inflows is at present all too often far from 
fully realised (Ballard, 2003); what cannot be gainsaid, however, is the immense potential for 
economic transformation in otherwise seriously under-developed regions which these capital 
transfers represent. If so, one of the most urgent policy priorities in this sphere should be to 
take urgent steps to enhance that potential, and to do everything possible to remove the 
obstacles which currently inhibit more positive developments.  
1 My own approach to the issues 
In sharp contrast to the economists, bankers and security experts who have generated the 
greater part of the recent spate of literature on remittances in general, and Hawala/IVTS in 
particular, my own involvement in these matters has arisen from my long-standing 
anthropological interest in the dynamics of one specific instance of these processes: the flow 
of labour migrants from South Asia to Britain, and the consequent counter-flow of 
remittances sent back by settlers to their villages of origin. However my knowledge of these 
issues was further enhanced as a result of being instructed to act as a defence expert in a 
series of cases in which Customs and Excise had charged a number of wholesale hawaladars 
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operating in major centres of Indian and Pakistani settlement in Britain with being engaged in 
a conspiracy to launder money.  
 
It follows that my perspective on the Hawala system highly specific in character. Not only is 
it very much from the bottom up, but in empirical terms it is largely restricted to a that part of 
the multi-stranded network of global value transfers which became engaged in the process of 
facilitating the delivery of funds to destinations in northern India and Pakistan. But whilst my 
detailed prior knowledge of Indian and Pakistani migrants’ settlement strategies, as well of 
their practices and priorities with respect both to the making and investment of remittances 
was undoubtedly of considerable assistance to the defence team, my role as an expert also 
provided me with an unprecedented opportunity to make a detailed exploration of 
Hawaladars’ business methods, and on that basis to gain an insight into the way in which the 
contemporary global Hawala system actually operates.1 This paper seeks to build on that 
experience to provide an analytical view of Hawala/IVTS which will, I trust, complement the 
existing literature on the subject, the greater part of which has been generated by economists.  
 
In the upshot my efforts to assist the court – and most especially the jury – to understand how 
Hawala systems actually operate about bore relatively little fruit: in general Customs and 
Excise secured the convictions which they were seeking. However the very experience of 
being instructed to act as expert witness also enabled me greatly to deepen my knowledge of 
the way in which the whole hawala system operated, since by doing so I was also able to gain 
access to all of the hawaladars’ records – which turned out in every case to be very extensive 
– which Customs and Excise had impounded in the course of their investigations.  
 
Hence this paper is based on the one hand on my own extensive ethnographic knowledge of 
the communities from which the Hawaladars and their customers were drawn, and on the 
other on the rich seam of information into which I was able to tap as a result of being able to 
examine the records of a series of major wholesale Hawaladars, who were between them 
participated in the overseas transfer of funds worth well over £600 million during a period of 
approximately two years. As a result of doing so I have been able to generate a far more 
complex understanding of the contemporary organisation of global hawala transfers than that 
set out in any of the existing literature, including that set out in the recent IMF/WB report on 
Informal Funds Transfer Systems (El Qorchi et al 2003).  
2 Hawala as a system of consolidation, de-consolidation and settlement 
As the vast bulk of the current literature quite correctly indicates, Hawala is essence a system 
of swaps. Moreover it is a system of swaps with which the staff of foreign exchange 
department in any international bank will be entirely familiar. If they can contrive to match 
their receipts of currency A from remitters with payments out in the same currency to local 
recipients with a parallel set of payments, both out and in, denominated in currency B at some 
distant branch in another country, the Bank can maximise its profits, for it can avoid the cost 
of settlement. However as every international banker is well aware, operations in the real 
world are far more complex. Even though the sum of all foreign exchange transactions on a 
global scale must by definition be zero, given a multiplicity of currencies, a multiplicity of 
foreign exchange operations and a huge daily volume of individual transactions, the books of 
any one institution, no matter hw vast it may be and how global its reach can at the end of the 
                                                 
1  The basic document on Hawala which I prepared for use in the courts can be found at 
http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/hawala.pdf 
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day only be balanced by engaging in an extremely complex – and necessarily expensive – 
process of consolidation and settlement with other like operators.  
 
Contemporary remittance-driven hawala operates in just the same universe – and 
consequence can only proceed by constructing settlement processes which are identical in 
structural character – although not in organisational terms – to those deployed by more 
formally constituted international banks. Nevertheless from the customers’ perspective the 
operation could not look more different. In the first place Hawaladars do not operate from 
within expensive marble-clad banking halls: on the contrary their central premises are a great 
deal more modest, and the system can be accessed through a multiplicity of agents, many of 
whom offer hawala services as a side-business within a small local grocery store or a travel 
agency. Moreover the transaction itself is much more informal. The Hawaladar and his 
customers are usually members of the same small ethnic colony, so they are in no sense 
strangers to each other. Having established the sterling cost of the rupee sum required, the 
customer hands over his payment – invariably in cash – supplies the name, the address, and a 
few additional personal details of the recipient to whom the payment is to be delivered. The 
funds are normally available within 48 hours, and may either delivered in person to the 
recipient, or failing that available for collection at the office of a nearby distributing 
hawaladar – no matter how remote the recipient’s place of residence may be.  
 
From its users’ point of view the system has everything to recommend it. The process of 
sending money is simple and straightforward, and involves a transaction routed through 
someone whom he already knows, and is not only extremely safe but is also provides a 
delivery system which is far swifter, and a great deal more straightforward than that provided 
by a formally constituted Bank or a specialist money transmission agency such as Western 
Union. Best off all the exchange rate offered by Hawaladars is frequently significantly better 
than the ‘official’ rate offered by the Banks, and the commission – if charged at all – is rarely 
much more than 1%. In straightforward commercial terms hawaladars offer an extremely 
good financial deal. Although the great majority of the transactions involve transfers ranging 
between a few hundreds to a few thousands of pounds (i.e. small sums in foreign exchange 
terms), the cost of transmitting funds through the Hawala system – thanks amongst other 
things to intense competition between rival Hawaladars – is but a small fraction of those 
incurred by those foolish enough to use the services of MoneyGram or Western Union, let 
alone the services of a formally constituted bank.   
 
Yet just how do hawaladars manage to achieve such a striking position of competitive 
advantage? The answer – as I soon discovered once I gained access to their records – was that 
although they use exactly the same procedures of consolidation and settlement as those 
deployed in the formal banking sector, they dramatically reduced their overhead costs by 
replacing formal bureaucratic procedures with relationships of personal trust whenever and 
wherever they possibly could. As a result their operation was far more efficient, so much so 
that they could still make a profit even though their fees were dramatically lower. However 
despite widespread suggestions that ‘Hawaladars keep no records’ I soon discovered that this 
was not at all the case. Indeed given the large number of individual transactions which major 
Hawaladars processed, let alone the scale and complexity of the settlement processes which 
were integral to their execution, there is no way in which the system could operate as swiftly 
and efficiently as it did in the absence of formal records. Indeed it was precisely by tracing 
through those records – significant proportion of which are held, paradoxically enough, in the 
formal banking sector – that I began to appreciate the scale and sophistication of the system’s  
consolidation and settlement processes. This is by no means a ‘system without records’: 
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indeed there would be no way in which global IVTS (of which Indian Ocean based Hawala 
operations are but a local component) could process a flow of funds in the order of $80 
billion per annum in their absence. What I did notice, however, was the record-keeping was 
parsimonious and therefore highly efficient, since Hawaladars only kept records of the 
information which they and their immediate partners needed to have access in order to 
process the transactions in which they themselves were involved. All other information was 
treated as superfluous.   
3 Hawala in practice 
How, though, did all this work out in practice? If we begin with the driven remittance arm of 
these processes, the lowest rung in the operation is one in which local hawaladars take in 
deposits in hard currencies (£ sterling in my case), takes down details of the person to whom 
an agreed upon sum of rupees is to be delivered in India and Pakistan, and then transmit 
(usually by fax but sometimes by email) a tranche of details of rupee payments to be made to 
specific recipients to a series of partner-distributors in India and Pakistan. An examination of 
those faxes not only enables on to identify the sender of each payment, but also provides a 
wealth of detail about the precise location of each recipient. However it is also worth noting 
that only a small proportion of those taking in payments in the UK actually faxed instructions 
overseas in this way. Instead the vast majority of those who did so were (often unbeknownst 
to their customers) acting as agents for hawaladars proper, who typically ran considerably 
bigger operations from the heart of one or other of Britain’s major South Asian settlements in 
Britain. In other words what we find right at the bottom of the system is a complex network 
of agencies and sub-agencies whose central role is to funnel in a large number of instructions 
of the kind outlined above to the hawaladar proper, who is then able to take advantage of very 
substantial economies of scale by bundling whole tranches of instructions together in a single 
fax, a series of which are then sent off to specific partners in India or Pakistan. As we shall 
see, consolidation is a key to the success of the whole operation.  
 
However as El Qorchi and his colleagues make clear, there is very little prospect of deals of 
this kind being settled by a simple bilateral swap. In the areas of high emigration to which the 
bulk of such remittances are despatched there are few, if any, customers seeking to exchange 
rupees for £ sterling or $US. Settlement is a much more complex process, as is evidenced by 
the fact that virtually all the cash deposited with Hawaladars in the UK is (or at least was) 
normally bulked up into large tranches, usually somewhere in the region of £100,000, 
deposited with a local bank, transferred from a £sterling to a $US account, and promptly 
despatched by TT to an account in a major institution such as Bank of America or Midland 
Marine in New York. Part of the logic for all this was quite clear. Those Hawaladars whose 
business credentials were accepted by the manager of a local Branch of a UK bank were not 
only able to set up foreign exchange accounts which could handle such a daily volume of 
business for at a relatively low rate of commission, but also to negotiate reduced deposit 
charges by undertaking the task of counting and bundling the currency notes on an in-house 
basis. Clearly the more these operations could be consolidated, the lower the transaction cost 
became, with the result that only a minority of the Hawaladars engaged in sending faxes to 
remittance distributors in South Asia (whom I shall describe hence forth a retail hawaladars) 
had access to such foreign exchange facilities. Hence in yet another layer of consolidation, 
anywhere between eight and fifteen of these retail hawaladars channelled their funds onwards 
through a wholesale hawaladar (of whom there appear to have been somewhere between 15 
and 20 serving the South Asian market in the UK), who in turn converted the funds into $US 
and sent them on to New York – and rather less frequently to a range of other overseas 
destinations, although these were rarely if ever located in South Asia. Just as in the case of 
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the retail hawaladars’ faxes to their distributing partners in India and Pakistan, there were 
voluminous records of all these transactions, since the account number and beneficiary of 
each such transaction was recorded in detail in the wholesale Hawaladar’s bank statement.  
 
Nevertheless to those observers unfamiliar with settlement processes, this whole scenario 
appeared to be highly suspicious. Huge sums of cash were delivered to wholesale Hawaladars 
on a daily basis, allegedly from a network of retail Hawaladars, as well from an even larger 
network of agents and sub-agents; but when the cash finally met the formal banking system it 
was transmitted not to India or Pakistan, but overwhelmingly to New York. The only sensible 
explanation for transactions on this scale – so HM Customs and Excise argued – was that this 
whole operation was in fact a major exercise in money-laundering, to which the sending of 
remittances to India and Pakistan merely provided a conveniently obfuscatory front.  
 
Whilst there is no way of gainsaying the fact that the validity of this argument was accepted 
by the juries before whom this case was made, with the result that the Hawaladars on trial are 
currently serving lengthy jail sentences, there nevertheless good reasons for proceeding with 
my analytical arguments. Even if the retail hawala transactions were indeed no more than a 
convenient cover for money laundering and terrorist financing (an issue to which I will return 
once again below), serious issues still remain. Given that Hawaladars hardly sent any funds at 
all to Pakistan, how was it that their distributor hawaladars in India and Pakistan were able to 
pay out very large sums in rupees to the nominated recipients? After all they were not in the 
business for charity’s sake.  
 
To any international banker there is an obvious answer to this conundrum: there must be a 
process of settlement going on somewhere or other. Moreover the more closely I examined 
the hawaladar’s record, the more I was able to bring an outline of these processes into focus, 
as well as the identity and location of the brokers who put them together. The vast majority 
turned out to be located in Dubai. With that in mind let me introduce a third level of hawala 
operator, whose swaps more or less match (at least in structural terms) the simple bilateral 
settlement model set out in most of the current literature. However such global Hawaladars 
have no contact whatsoever with the relatively tiny sums remitted by labour migrants. Instead 
such hawaladars characteristically broker deals on behalf of lower-level hawaladars, both 
wholesale and retail, and also on behalf of large commercial clients. Such deals are very 
large: since the minimum unit of account in such operations appears to be US$ 100,000, there 
are good reasons to believe that each of the swaps so brokered will be in the multi-million 
dollar range.  
4 Hawala as a vehicle for settlement 
Yet just how much evidence is there for the actual existence of global hawaladars, given that 
as far as I am aware there is no mention whatsoever either of them and or of such settlement 
activities in the current literature? My own response to this question is two-fold: partly 
theoretical and partly empirical. 
 
In the first place it is quite clear that if the annual outflow of migrant remittances from the 
developed to the developing world through informal channels is of the same order of 
magnitude as $US 80 billion per annum outflow through formal channels, then there must 
also by definition be a similarly sized counter-flow of value by way of settlement. But whilst 
the IMF Report outlines a range of possible means whereby the necessary settlement 
processes might be implemented (El-Qorchi et al 2003: 14 - 17), the authors make no effort 
to explore how, where and by what means settlements on the massive scale required are 
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achieved in practice; and whilst I would not suggest for a moment that my bottom-up 
perspective can allow me to gain a comprehensive grasp of what is happening in the financial 
stratosphere, the empirical material to which I have managed to gain access has enabled me 
to make a considerable degree of empirically grounded progress towards doing so. 
 
The window of opportunity through which I have been able to peer was nevertheless very 
narrow, since I have only had access to UK wholesale hawaladars and their records.2 
Nevertheless it soon became clear that a number of Pakistani-owned Exchange Houses in 
Dubai played a key role in the settlement process: it was precisely in the course of 
negotiations with these settlement houses (and/or their agents) that wholesale Hawaladars in 
the UK were drawn into deals which enabled the delivery of bulk payments in rupees to their 
delivery hawaladars in South Asia to matched with the transmission of an equivalent sum in 
US dollars to New York. Hence UK-based wholesale Hawaladars daily dealings entailed 
close coordination along three quite separate but closely inter-connected vectors of 
communication. The first of these was the faxing of instructions specifying exactly how many 
rupees should be paid out to whom to their distributor-partners in Pakistan; the second 
involved daily negotiations with global Hawaladars based in Dubai for the for the delivery of 
the requisite quantity of rupees to their distributor partners, against the delivery of an agreed 
amount of US dollars, which were normally sent to an account maintained by the Exchange 
House in New York; the third element was the delivery (usually by Brinks or Securicor) of a 
consignment of ready-counted cash to their bank, together with instructions for conversion to 
US$ and onward transmission by TT to New York.  
 
Since these carefully choreographed moves, which were repeated daily, were part of a global 
settlement process, it follows that each such deal was matched by an equally carefully 
choreographed set of moves whereby the customer or customers who released the rupees in 
Pakistan for onward delivery to the distributor hawaladars in exchange for the consignment 
of US $ which had been sent from UK to New York. Sometimes – although relatively rarely, 
as far as I could determine – this transaction might take the form of a direct bilateral swap, in 
which case the US$ payment might be made directly into an overseas account held by a 
business or individual based in Pakistan. More usually, however this result appears to have 
been achieved in the context of a much more complex multilateral (and hence multinational 
and multi-currency) settlement engineered by one or other of the Exchange Houses in Dubai. 
I should emphasise that I use the word ‘appear’ quite deliberately: given the data to which I 
had access I was only a very distant observer of these transactions. Nevertheless having 
pieced all the snippets of information available into a reasonably coherent picture, the best 
explanation that I have been able to come up with runs as follows.  
 
As labour migration into the gulf region took off during the 1970’s, a small number of Indian 
and Pakistani entrepreneurs based in Dubai began to offer money transmission services back 
to migrants’ villages of origins in South Asia, doubtless facilitated by hawala deals with 
                                                 
2  In normal circumstances these records would also have been inaccessible, if only for the reason that bankers 
everywhere would not normally open their records to outsiders; however given that the Hawaladars in 
question were facing long terms of imprisonment, that Customs and Excise had already impounded their 
records (such that I too could gain access to them in my role as an expert for the defence), and that the 
Hawaladars had nothing to loose by explaining all their trade secrets to me, I was able to gain an 
exceptional insight into their operation. But since, by the same token, all their partners at every level in the 
operation, whether in the UK or overseas, were in very real danger of finding themselves dragged into the 
dock if they discussed such matters with me, it was hardly surprising that they became even more reluctant 
to talk than ever before.  
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individuals and commercial enterprises in both India and Pakistan whose access hard 
currency was severely restricted by draconian foreign exchange controls. As the years passed 
these Exchange Houses became more numerous, and the scale of their activities grew equally 
steadily. This pattern of growth received a major boost when the oldest and largest of these 
Exchange Houses, UAE Exchange, gained access to the SWIFT system of global inter-bank 
electronic money transfers around a decade ago. However if I am right in thinking that Dubai 
is a settlement centre, it also followed that the Exchange Houses also needed to do deals 
between themselves. Hence it should come as no surprise that the UAE Exchange soon set up 
a secure intranet which not only took in all the other Exchange Houses in the city but also 
linked them to its SWIFT facilities.  
 
So just what was (and is) the core business of these Exchange Houses – all of which are 
properly constituted LLCs licensed (and in that sense regulated) by the UAE authorities?  At 
one level they operate quite straightforwardly as both retail and wholesale Hawaladars, taking 
in funds from innumerable agents across the whole Gulf Region as well as on over-the-
counter in Dubai itself, and arranging their delivery to migrants’ families across the length 
and breadth of South and South East Asia. However at another level it also seems equally 
clear – at least on the basis of the evidence to which I now have access – that these Exchange 
Houses also play a crucial role in setting up hawala-style settlements on a truly wholesale 
basis, since as appears that all the transactions in which they engage at this level take place in 
multiples of $100,000. Moreover the central source of liquidity in this process is equally 
clear: it stems from the huge sums which migrants from South, East and South East Asia 
working in West Asia, Western Europe and North America are currently remitting back home 
to their families through informal channels.  
 
But what about the counter-flows? At this point I must admit that I am still not in a position 
to identify the source of these with any great precision: other than the global Hawaladars 
themselves – or failing that access to their bank accounts in New York – could provide a final 
answer to that question. Nevertheless all the evidence that I have so far accumulated suggests 
that source of these counter-transfers remains much the same as they were when the UAE 
Exchange first opened for business. If so they are overwhelmingly the outcome of 
innumerable value transfers made by individuals, and above all by commercial enterprises, 
which find themselves located in financial jurisdictions where access to foreign exchange is 
so tightly restricted that they have no alternative but to turn to the ‘black market’ if they wish 
to finance almost any kind of transnational commercial activity. In these circumstances – and 
they are circumstances which hold good in a substantial part of the whole vast Asian region – 
it follows that hawala transactions provide the only effective means of means of participating 
in the global commercial order.  
 
Hence whilst I can offer no concrete proof in favour of such a proposition, I would submit 
that what we have here is a plausible explanation of the source of the funds to match the total 
outflow of value tied up global informal migrant remittance transfers, but one which also 
suggests that the inflow of remittances down informal channels, no less than those funnelled 
through more formal structures and institutions are a vital source of hard-currency liquidity 
for business enterprises (and sometimes even often for governments) in some of the least 
developed corners of the developing world.  
5 The status of the informal sector  
Even though a large part of the real economy in most parts of the developing world is best 
regarded as lying in the informal sector, from a formal sector perspective the grey and/or 
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black markets in which most transaction in that sector take place are invariably perceived as 
dens of unregulated criminal and near criminal iniquity. In the case of Hawala that perception 
was strongly reinforced in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, and as a result of the 
provisions of Patriot Act a whole host of regulatory efforts currently identified as AML/CFT 
were let loose on a global scale.  
 
Before considering the logic and likely effectiveness of this new global regulatory regime 
which both the Fund and the Bank are now so actively sponsoring, it is worth making a few 
comments about the commercial efficiency of hawala as a system of money transmission. 
Although my personal experience is limited to transactions in the UK – South Asia arena, all 
indications suggest that the system is extremely reliable. Funds invariably arrive on time at 
their destinations, and despite the huge value of the sums transmitted, and the absence of any 
regulatory order other than that of personal trust, defaults have been extremely rare – at least 
until very recently. Moreover these recent defaults have not arisen because of scams internal 
to the system, but rather as a result of regulatory interventions. These interventions – largely 
justified on the grounds that hawala was merely a vehicle either for laundering profits of the 
sale of drugs or for terrorist finance – have by no means restricted to the UK alone. 
Nevertheless Customs and Excise ‘success’ in impounding several millions of pounds of cash 
in transit through the system, supplemented by the confiscation of all the convicted 
Hawaladars’ personal assets necessarily caused a serious system default, and rendered the 
whole system far more risky than it had been hitherto.  
 
Other than this system appears both to be highly efficient in organisational terms, and to be 
very effectively self-regulating. Yet just how was this achieved? As we have seen hawaladars 
do indeed keep records, but on a very different basis than that deployed in the formal sector, 
with the result that they are far less voluminous. The information which each operator at each 
level in the system actually records is largely restricted to solely that which is vital to the 
completion of the transactions in which he is involved with his own immediate partners. 
Taking view that the next set of transactions further on down the network in which his 
partners are involved are of no concern to him, there is no need to explore  - and still less to 
record the details of – those transactions. All that mattered was that just as his partners trusted 
him to implement his agreed-upon deals swiftly and reliably, so he in turn trusted them.  
 
This, then, was a distributed system in which there was no central record-keeper, nor any 
excess of record keeping at each of the many nodes in the network. In other words it was a 
system where security was grounded in mutual trust, rather in system where the central 
guarantee against malfeasance was the availability of detailed, checkable and auditable and 
endlessly reduplicated bureaucratic records at every level in the system. But whilst such 
informality, and above all the absence of any kind of centralised records might be a complete 
nightmare from an accountant’s point of view, Hawala fitted its purposes as a value 
transmission system extremely well. By cutting out all unnecessary bureaucratic procedures 
Hawala, and by cutting profit margins at every level in the system to the bone, Hawala 
offered its customers a deal which was far superior to that which either Banks or specialist 
money-transmission agencies could ever hope to achieve.  
 
Nevertheless it is also worth noting that Hawala does not wholly disregard the formal 
banking system. Quite the contrary. In keeping with its commitment to taking strategic 
advantage of all available facilities as and when they suited its purposes, Hawala in no sense 
operated outwith the formal banking system. Hence whilst the collection and distribution of 
cash as well as processes of consolidation and de-consolidation (for both of which Banks 
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charge substantial fees) are invariably handled informally, once consolidation had reached a 
sufficient scale Hawaladars promptly turned to the Banks’ wholesale money transmission 
facilities as a means of completing settlements. This also explains the key role of New York 
in the whole system. Since opportunities to arrange simple bilateral swaps relatively rarely 
occur, despite their greater profitability, the services of Dubai’s Exchange Houses were 
invariably needed to construct the necessary settlements. However once arranged, those 
settlements were invariably implemented in US$, the global medium of exchange, and thus 
ultimately transacted on the computers of major international banks in New York, where they 
presumably leave a very clear audit trail. To sum up, Hawala does not operate outside the 
formal international banking system. Rather Hawaladars routinely utilise its facilities, 
although they do so judiciously and for there own purposes. Any other approach would pile 
on the overheads, and undermine the fine-tuned logic of their commercially successful 
business 
6 The relationship between Hawala and the formally organised financial sector  
Nevertheless there is an important sense contemporary hawala is a child of regulatory 
restrictions. If such severe restrictions on access to foreign exchange had not been introduced 
in so many parts of Asia and Africa in the immediate post-colonial period, such that many 
commercial enterprises had no alternative but to rely on the black market to do business, and 
if an ever-growing volume of migrant remittances had not emerged as a means of satiating 
the equally rapidly growing demand for hard currency, the contemporary hawala system 
would not have developed nearly so swiftly as it did. However that is by far from being the 
whole story. If it was the steady relaxation of foreign exchange controls in recent years would 
have fatally eroded the hawala system. That has not happened because many further strands 
underpin its success and stability. 
 
One of these is, of course, the sheer commercial efficiency of the whole operation, which 
provides a vehicle for the transmission of value within a global arena at a fraction of the 
expenses incurred when the same operation is channelled through the formal banking sector; 
secondly it provides a highly effective vehicle for sustaining commercial transaction in 
regions where the formal banking sector, and indeed the state, has collapsed, as in Somalia, 
Iraq, Afghanistan and in much of Central Asia; thirdly its principle are immediately 
congruent with the cash-based informal economies within which the greater part of the rural 
population in many of the least developed economies operate on a day to day basis – and 
from whose ranks a large proportion of global labour migrants are recruited. Last but not least 
Hawala provides a ready means of facilitating trade across nominally ‘closed’ borders: after 
all what was the Iran-Contra Affair but a classic example of a carefully engineered piece of 
ad hoc hawala finance, designed to achieve otherwise unattainable ends?  
 
However it is not regulation-busting strategies of this kind which is currently causing global 
financial regulators – from James Wolfensohn onwards – so much concern. Rather it is the 
fear that Hawala not only could be, but actually is, primarily a front for the laundering of 
funds which have been illegitimately acquired through the sale of narcotics, together with the 
principal means whereby international terrorists finance their operations. As a result elaborate 
AML/CFT programs are currently being rolled out – at vast expense – on a global scale. If 
these were to successfully fulfil their objectives Hawala as we currently know it would 
effectively be ruled out of order, not only would that many millions of migrant workers 
would have no alternative but to use the much more expensive facilities of formal sector to 
remit their savings back home, but the initiatives in the informal economy which have grown 
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up as a result of their arrival in so many parts of the developing world would be equally 
seriously disrupted. 
 
But before pressing on to explore these issues – which lie at the core of the Conference’s 
agenda – we must first address the terrorist agenda. Just how far are the fears which lie 
behind the current drive to implement AML/CFT programmes, and hence to comprehensively 
regulate financial transactions on a global scale, actually justified? In doing so one point is 
quite beyond question. There can be no doubt whatsoever that hawala-style operations could 
be used to launder the proceeds of the international trade in narcotics, and also to supply all 
manner of terrorist groups with the funds they need to carry out their nefarious activities. 
However that should not be a cause for any surprise. By just the same token the formal 
banking sector could be used – and plainly has been used – for precisely these purposes. 
Hence the central issue here is not so much whether Hawala could be so used, but whether it 
has actually been so used, and perhaps more pertinently still whether the Hawala has, as a 
system, has any built-in safeguards against the prospect of it being so misused. If so, it also 
becomes possible to explore how those internal safeguards might be reinforced as an 
alternative to the sledgehammer approach which seeks to regulate the whole operation out of 
existence.  
7 Hawala as a vehicle for money laundering? 
So just how much concrete evidence do we have of Hawala being used to surreptitiously 
transmit funds which were either the product of, or were being used to finance, serious 
criminal activity? Before addressing that question directly, several vital caveats must be 
introduced. Firstly I should emphasise shall my remarks here apply to Hawala systems, rather 
than to ad hoc bilateral swap. These can indeed very easily be set up as a means of covering 
up criminal activity – as in the case of the Iran-Contra affair, for example. Secondly I am 
mindful of the fact that formal logic insists that proving a negative is an impossible feat, and 
also that any attempt to insist that illegal transactions never occur in a system of transactions 
so large, complex and global as IVTS/Hawala would be extremely foolish. In like manner 
even the most carefully regulated Bank would be leaving a large hostage if it went so far as to 
suggest that those engaged in criminal activities had never been amongst its customers, or 
that its implementation of all the latest AML/CTF measures could be guaranteed to prevent 
that from ever recurring. 
 
Let me therefore begin by asking whether there is any concrete evidence that the Hawala 
transactions with which I am intimately familiar, in other words those between the UK and 
South Asia and which involved the transmission of in excess of £500 million overseas, 
actually included a significant amount of funds which were the profits of drug smuggling, or 
which were intended to finance terrorist activities. On the face of it this question can be 
answered very straightforwardly: at least one of the hawaladars pleaded guilty as charged, 
and in all the other cases which have so far been tried, the jury found the hawaladars guilty as 
charged. As a result that they were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and all their 
assets (both commercial and personal) were seized by the Crown. However closer 
examination of these proceedings throws up a much more disturbing picture. The hawaladar 
who pleaded guilty did so in substantial part because he was advised by his counsel that 
although in terms of sheer logic he was in a position to but an extremely strong case in his 
defence, there was no way in which he could come anywhere near guaranteeing that the jury 
would accept the validity of his arguments. Indeed given that such huge sums of money were 
involved, that the defendants were all South Asian, that the events of 9/11 lay in the very 
recent past, and there popular hostility to the South Asian presence appeared to be running 
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high in the area from which the jury was likely to be drawn, he had to report that he was 
pessimistic about the likely outcome if the case went to trial. In the face of this advice the 
hawaladar concerned concluded that his best strategy was simply to plead guilty, in the 
expectation that he would receive a substantially lighter sentence than he would if he had 
mounted a defence. His decision was well-advised. Several further cases have been to trial 
since then, and all led to convictions.  
 
Sceptical readers may well be asking whether the juries’ verdicts in the cases cited above 
were actually quite correct. With that in mind let me provide a brief summary of the evidence 
led by the Crown. Despite having conducted very extensive surveillance operations prior to 
arresting the suspects, Customs and Excise Officers were not in a position to produce no 
direct evidence that the large sums of cash delivered to the Hawaladars’ premises were 
actually profits accrued from the sale of drugs. Indeed as far as I am aware they arrested no 
wholesale drugs traffickers the course of these operations. Instead they relied on 
circumstantial evidence – showing that some of the couriers making cash deliveries had 
associations with drugs traffickers, although all of these appear to have been very low level 
operatives.  
 
However the Crown bulked out this surely very flimsy circumstantial evidence by arguing 
that ‘sensibly’ there could be no other explanation as to why huge sums in cash should have 
been carted around the country in holdalls and cardboard boxes, or why the funds so collected 
should have been sent to New York rather than to Pakistan, or why the Hawaladars were 
unable to identify the specific individuals to whom the wholesale consignments of cash 
which they received actually belonged, or to identity of ultimate beneficiaries of the funds 
despatched to New York. Hence the Crown argued that whilst retail Hawala (which it 
assumed was grounded in straightforward bilateral swaps) was in broad terms legitimate, the 
Hawaladars in question were using this legitimate retail business as a convenient front behind 
which to conceal massive money-laundering operations. Despite all efforts by the defence to 
counter this view, the Crown’s argument was accepted by the jury in every case that has so 
far gone to trial. Nor did there appear to be much disagreement about the matter, since they 
required little time for deliberation before reaching their verdicts. 
 
To set these verdicts in context it is also worth noting that if these Hawaladars activities had 
been inspected using the IMF’s currently preferred AML/CFT instruments, their practices 
would also have been found wanting on precisely the same grounds as those deployed by the 
prosecution: the Hawaladars were unable to identify the original source of the wholesale 
funds passing though their hands, and to the extent that the bulk of the funds sent to New 
York were sent into one or other of the Exchange Houses accounts, there was no way in 
which the could identify the ultimate beneficiaries of these transfers either. But is this clear-
cut evidence of money laundering, as the Crown alleged, or is it precisely what one would 
expect to find in the context of a decentralised system of consolidation and settlement? 
 
My own understanding of hawala as a system points strongly to the second conclusion: 
indeed it seems to me that whatever point an investigator chose to tap into this global 
network, exactly the same patterns would be revealed. Whilst every hawaladar records full 
details of all his transactions with his immediate partners, the further transactions in which 
his partners were involved he would little or no knowledge of the next set of transactions in 
which those partners were involved further down the line. It is, of course, precisely this lack 
knowledge – and of records – AML/CFT activists find so alarming: from their perspective a 
system such as this appears to be wide open to penetration by drugs barons and terrorists.  
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8 Formal and informal methods of ensuring system security 
But just how justified are their fears? To those wedded to the merits of bureaucratic 
procedures, the only way in which system security can be guaranteed is through the 
maintenance of comprehensive records systems, which can then be opened to inspection by a 
whole series of accountants, auditors and regulators, both internal and external. However the 
informally organised Hawala system utilises an entirely different approach: security is 
guaranteed not by formal bureaucratic procedures, but rather by ties of absolute mutual 
personal trust between each pair of hawaladars, which consequently become a characteristic 
of the network as a whole. Yet how just how can that trust be guaranteed? And are there any 
sanctions against malfeasance? It is quite clear that such sanctions do exist – although they 
are rather different in format from those deployed in the formal sector. 
 
If security is guaranteed by relationships of absolute trust, it follows that every hawaladar’s 
most pressing responsibility is not to betray that trust, not least because just as in the formal 
banking sector, a default at any point in a chain of transactions can have exceedingly far-
reaching repercussions. To put it in more formal terms, all hawaladars have an unspoken duty 
of care towards each other. If this is so it also follows that any hawaladar who knowingly 
entered a deal with a person whom he knew3 to be a major drug-smuggler, and or to have 
terrorist operations in mind, would not only be taking a major personal risk, but would also 
be engaging in a transaction which – if discovered by his partners – would not only most 
likely obliterate the relationship of trust between them, but would precipitate severe 
sanctions. Not only would the hawaladar and his entire family find themselves excluded from 
hawala operations, but most likely from their entire ethnic community as well.  
 
In view of all this it is quite clear – no less theoretically than empirically – that regulation and 
security can be achieved just as effectively – and possibly more effectively – through 
informal networks of personal trust as through the formal bureaucratic procedures. Two 
points are well worth considering on this score. Firstly there is plentiful evidence to suggest 
that that at the very highest levels of commercial activity – international banking, for example 
– relationships of personal trust play a key role in guaranteeing security; and secondly that 
bureaucratic procedures to achieve that goal can be and are regularly circumvented by those 
who occupy a position of sufficient bureaucratic seniority. If Enron is but one example of 
such malfeasance in the developed world, such scams are even more frequent in the 
developing world, as migrant workers are only too well aware. Hence migrants’ strong 
tendency to rely on the informal sector is to a large extent an entirely rational choice.  
9 Migrant remittances, economic development and AML/CFT initiatives 
To return to the core concerns of this Conference, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the 
current global flow of migrant remittances has a tremendous potential for generating 
economic development, especially in the otherwise capital-starved regions from which the 
great majority of labour migrants are drawn. To be sure that potential has so far been largely 
unrealised, at least in part because that potential has either been overlooked or mishandled by 
the formal sector – whether in Washington DC or in national capitals in most parts of the 
developing world. However there are now clear signs that the resulting logjam is now 
                                                 
3  It goes without saying that the personal relationship of trust between hawaladars who introduce cash into 
the system and their customer, as well as between the hawaladar who makes the final delivery and the recipient 
will also be extremely close. There is no way in which unknown outsiders can penetrate the system, particularly 
if they seek to use it as a means of transmitting large sums in cash. Who knows, in current circumstances such 
strangers might well be AML/CFT investigators. 
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beginning to break, and that all manner of new policy initiatives are now being developed. 
Against that background this Conference’s exploration of the contribution which the financial 
sector can make towards releasing this potential can only be regarded as extremely welcome. 
However if real progress is to be made, we must take great care to avoid past mistakes. 
 
Administrators, policy makers and planners sit in offices, and as a result their view of the 
world is almost inevitably formal, numerical and top-down in character. However if I have 
learned anything during the course of my anthropological ‘bottom up’ observations of 
transnational migrants, it is their refusal to take no for answer, their refusal to be cowed by 
apparently overwhelming obstacles, and most especially their immense success in devising 
strategies by means of which to take opportunistic advantage of whatever niches which they 
able to identify in the global labour market. Not did they devise these entrepreneurial 
strategies with little assistance from anyone else, but they are currently using just the same 
tactics to deliver a huge inflow of development capital into their home villages, and hence 
into the local economy of the immediate localities within which those villages are set. In 
almost every case the scale of that inflow is that provided by the combined efforts of national 
governments, international aid agencies, and assorted NGOs. Yet despite the scale of these 
(heavily localised) inflows, sustainable development has failed to take off, leading many 
more centrally located planners and administrators to argue that returnee migrants are their 
own worst enemies, and that the principal reason why the development potential fails to take 
off is that the returnees and their kinsfolk are handicapped by their lack skills, foresight and 
entrepreneurial abilities amongst the migrants themselves. In my view this top-down view is 
largely specious. As I have argues in some detail elsewhere (Ballard 2003, 1988), observed 
outcomes in so many high-emigrant regions are far better understood as a consequence of 
externally imposed structural constraints than on the absence of appropriate skills and 
abilities within the local population: their immense entrepreneurial success once they leave 
their villages of origin gives the lie to all such suggestions.  
 
Within that conspectus, current international efforts to regulate Hawala transactions on 
AML/CFT grounds, and to divert the remittance flow into more expensive and less efficient 
institutionally regulated channels such as Western Union can only be read in one way: as a 
potential further obstacle to – or to be more specific a significant tax on – migrants’ efforts to 
invest in, and to promote the economic development of, their home villages. Moreover the 
benefits of that tax are most unlikely to be ploughed back into their own villages: on the 
contrary they are much more likely to be paid out to meet the salaries of the army of clerks 
and bureaucrats who will need to be hired if remittances are to be channelled through formal 
rather than informal channels.  
 
A large question also needs to be put over the issue of whether the tightly ordered regulatory 
regime which is now being planned will actually work, for one of the most consistent 
characteristics of the behaviour of these skilled exponents of ‘globalisation from below’ 
(Smith and Guarnizo 1998) is that their capacity to circumvent the worst of the obstacles 
placed in their path. Hence it would appear that Hawaladars at all levels have already begun 
to develop strategies by means of which to cope with new AML/CFT regimes, although these 
necessarily invariably add – sometimes marginally and sometimes very significantly – to 
their transaction costs. However there are few signs that these are anywhere near as high as 
those of formally constituted – and hence bureaucratically top-heavy – agencies such as 
Western Union. Hawala – just like so many other institutions and practices in the formal 
sector – clearly has a future, come what may.  
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10 Conclusion 
If so, the time has surely come to get real. It is not just that far reaching transformations are 
being wrought socio-structural order in all of world’s highly developed economies as a result 
of mass migration ‘from below’: the same is true of the global financial order, and also of 
those specific localities from which the bulk of that outflow currently takes place. With that 
in mind it is worth turning to another area in which formally constituted authorities’ efforts to 
impose centralised (or perhaps more accurately hegemonic) control over the entrepreneurial 
activities of transnational migrants: border controls. As Bhagwati (2003: 99) has recently 
argued, all developed economies now need to recognise that despite all their efforts – both 
individual and collective – to hold the pass, in de facto terms all have now lost control of 
their borders. In consequence he argues that all governments must now recognise that the 
inflow of migrant workers “cannot be effectively constrained and must now be creatively 
accommodated”. Just the same argument holds true – or so I would suggest – in many other 
spheres, including those with which we are concerned in this conference.  
 
Remarkably enough a prescient argument along just these lines has already been developed 
by a former World Bank officer in a monograph strikingly entitled Undermining the Centre 
(Addleton 1992). So germane are the conclusions of his study – which is based on his 
observation of developments in Pakistan during the 1980’s – that I feel I can best close my 
contribution to the deliberations of this Conference by quoting him at length. No less than I, 
Addleton is clearly deeply impressed by the autonomous basis on which the whole migrant 
enterprise was proceeding, so much that central attempts to manage those processes – to the 
extent that they had any impact at all – precipitated far more negative than positive 
consequences. Hence as he puts it:  
 
“Nowhere were the decentralising aspects of migration more clear than in the area of 
remittances. Controlled entirely by individual workers rather than government entities, 
investment and consumption decisions rested entirely with individual migrants themselves. 
Remittance earnings also fuelled an active parallel market which grew rapidly in the 
1970sa and 1980s and seemed impervious to centralized government control. This parallel 
market extended not only to the hundi foreign exchange markets ... [but] also a flourishing 
black market in consumer goods, characterized by the development of alternative trading 
networks beyond the reach of government. Neither the hundi market for foreign exchange 
transactions nor the black market for imported consumer goods was penetrable by the 
government in terms of taxation or any other kind of control. Taken in the aggregate, the 
remittance segment of the national economy emerged as one of the most vibrant and 
important areas of activity … overshadowing foreign aid disbursements and … exceeded 
the resources that the government itself was able to earn off exports or channel toward 
national development programmes. 
The decentralizing aspects of migration were felt in other areas as well. The emphasis on 
personal consumption and individual preference meant that the largest investments in 
community goods relating to health and education, and usually regarded as the 
responsibility of central and provincial governments, were difficult to finance. … While 
millions of Pakistanis were undoubtedly better off in material terms, poor literacy rates and 
an abysmal health care system continued to pose enormous challenges. …. On the policy 
front, the most obvious implication from the Pakistan experience is that governments can 
do little to affect or influence a migration process which is largely demand-driven. 
…attempts to 'regularize' or 'control' the process are more likely to be damaging rather than 
beneficial. On the contrary, they will more likely result in an active blackmarket … and 
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circumvented government controls. The development of these parallel markets … carries a 
financial cost and introduces inefficiencies into the migration process…  
Viewed in this fashion, the best government response to migration is one that aims at 
improving the overall economic environment in all sectors. A banking policy that makes 
sense from a banking perspective will probably be attractive to the migrant community. 
Similarly, a foreign exchange policy where official exchange rates approximate .those 
prevailing on black markets will be most effective in attracting remittances from overseas 
emigrants through official channels.  
Migrants departed as a result of individual initiative or because of the efforts of hundreds of 
small private recruiting agents. Remittances were returned to hundreds of thousands of 
households, often as a result of services rendered by independent hundi agents acting alone. 
The spending and investment power made possible by remittances did not accrue to the 
government, but was widely diffused throughout the country. Remittances made parallel 
and informal marketplaces even more attractive than ever. The end result was a far more 
complex economy, marked shifts in investment and consumption patterns – and, most 
importantly, an undermined central government whose own role in mobilizing resources 
and directly managing the economic future of the nation was seriously diminished. 
(Addleton 1992: 207 - 212). 
 
On the face of it Addleton’s conclusion might appear to be entirely negative: mass emigration 
and the inflow of remittances on an equally massive scale undermines the capacity of 
Governments to control their own economy. However a closer inspection of his argument 
suggests that his position is actually far closer to Bhagwati’s: namely that in a world where 
transnational networks – from below no less than above – are becoming ever more salient, it 
makes far greater sense to develop policies which seek to manage (and hence assist and 
promote) the entrepreneurial potentialities embedded within these networks than to make 
vain attempts to corral them within a necessarily hegemonic regime of centralised regulation 
and control.  
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